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Feminist Lines of Flight from the 
Majoritarian Subject
Tamsin Lorraine Swarthmore College
Abstract
This paper characterises Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the 
majoritarian subject in A Thousand Plateaus as a particular — and 
inevitably transitory - manifestation of sexed and gendered subjectivity 
emerging with late capitalism from the always mutating flows of creative 
life and suggests that their notion of the schizo or nomadic subject 
can inspire feminist solutions to the impasses posed by contemporary 
forms of sexed, gendered, and sexual identity. Feminism can thus be 
conceived as a schizoanalytic practice that fosters the kind of alternative 
subjects for which Deleuze and Guattari call: subjects that move beyond 
oppressive self-other relations towards a form of subjectivity that can 
welcome differences as well as the differentiating force of life itself.
Keywords: Deleuze, Guattari, gender, feminism, identity, subjectivity.
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, in works they wrote separately as 
well as together, present an ontology of becoming, a conception of 
the modern subject of late capitalism, and intimations of future forms 
of humanity with intriguing implications for feminism. Their ontology 
posits humanity as a flux of always mutating becoming intertwined 
with creative flows of non-human and inhuman life, and thus contests 
essentialist views of women and men as well as a binary division 
between the two. Their conception of the modern ‘autonomous’ subject 
posits the latter as inevitably shot through with a multitude of social 
flows in shifting configurations that can be mapped with respect to 
specific locations in larger social wholes, and thus suggests a subject 
produced through collective processes that we can better understand and 
invites discriminating genealogies of gender in its imbrications with other 
aspects of social identity. And their notion of the schizo or nomadic 
subject dramatises possible ‘lines of flight’ from dominant forms of
Feminist Lines of Flight from the Mojoritarian Subject 61
subjectivity, and thus inspires feminist solutions to the impasses posed 
by contemporary forms of sexed, gendered, and sexual identity.
In what follows, I characterise Deleuze and Guattari’s conception 
of the modern subject as a particular-and inevitably transitory- 
manifestation of sexed and gendered subjectivity emerging with late 
capitalism from the always mutating flows of creative life and I explore 
the implications of their conception for a feminist project of social 
change. Although Deleuze and Guattari do not pursue this point the 
way I will throughout this essay, sexed, gendered, and sexual identity 
are central features of the oedipal subject, making the question of sexual 
difference a crucial one, at least if one wants to endorse their project of 
promoting schizo subjectivity as a project, as I will propose, of moving 
beyond oppressive self/other relations toward a form of subjectivity that 
can welcome differences as well as the differentiating force of life itself.
I. Oedipal Subjectivity and the Majoritarian Subject
According to the story Deleuze and Guattari tell in Anti-Oedipus, 
oedipalisation as a psychic structure of human subjectivity arose in 
the wake of capitalism’s deterritorialisation from the social systems of 
meaning of previous cultures. Anti-Oedipus is in large part a critique 
of psychoanalysis for further entrenching oedipal subjectivity rather 
than (as Deleuze and Guattari propose) moving us beyond it, but 
it is important to remember that Deleuze and Guattari ‘have never 
dreamed of saying that psychoanalysis invented Oedipus. Everything 
points in the opposite direction: the subjects of psychoanalysis arrive 
already oedipalized, they demand it, they want more’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1983: 121). Although they think that psychoanalysis gets the 
unconscious wrong and has fallen for the ruse oedipal subjectivity 
entails-that what the subject wants but cannot have is an incestuous 
relationship with his mother (rather than, as they see it, to engage in 
forms of desiring production that might unravel or revolutionise the 
social status quo)-the oedipal subject characterised by psychoanalysis 
is an ideal type of a fleeting form of modern subjectivity. This type may 
be actually manifest in a relatively small number of instances given the 
deterritorialising flows that undermine it as well as the vagaries of family 
life, but it is a form of subjectivity whose further unravelling they hope to 
promote. If the oedipal subject is the retrenchment of a more traditional 
form of subjectivity precipitated by the frantic deterritorialisation 
of capitalism, the schizo subject is a new form of subjectivity also
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precipitated by the deterritorialisation of capitalism - and it is the latter 
subject that Deleuze and Guattari prefer to support.
Although sexed and gendered identity may appear to be primary 
aspects of personal identity (checking off one’s race or religion may 
or may not be required, but checking off one’s sex usually is), on 
Deleuze and Guattari’s view, oedipal subjectivity obscures the multiple 
social flows implicated in family life. Markers of difference that have 
stable social significance in the territorial and despotic social formations 
Deleuze and Guattari describe lose their credibility in a capitalist social 
formation. Deference to abstract calculations of the market such as the 
need for workers who can migrate from one workplace to the next 
in keeping with the skills needed to produce the products that will 
sell the best take precedence over the significance of concrete relations 
with others in a variety of relatively stable social networks. Cultural 
and institutional support for various identities is weakened by the 
commodification of ethnic and cultural differences. The flows affecting 
a subject’s life are organised around sexed and gendered identities 
produced through a process of oedipalisation that requires constituting 
oneself as a lacking subject and taking up a position on either side of 
a sexual divide. Sexual difference becomes a crucial structural feature 
in the psychic structure of a personal self who can negotiate the speeds 
of capitalism without unravelling, but the flows affecting subjects are 
social, economic, political, cultural, racial, pedagogical, and religious, 
as much as sexed or gendered (see, for example, Deleuze and Guattari 
1983: 274).
While sexual difference is important to the territorial and despotic 
social formations Deleuze and Guattari describe, it is not personalised 
in the form of sexed and gendered identity and sexual preference the 
way it is in modern society.* According to Deleuze and Guattari’s view, 
human subjects enter into polyvocal and multiple relations with their 
world. A child is always making assemblages - pushing an ant along with 
a stick, jumping in a puddle to see the water splash, blowing bubbles in 
the milk to see them cascade over the sides. These assemblages unfold 
not as expressions of the secret desires of a personal self, but through 
body parts becoming the working parts of assemblages that connect with 
the world in terms of their capacities to affect and be affected (air plus 
throat plus milk in glass make bubbles that spill over). Oedipalisation 
requires the subject to internalise the prohibitions of paternal law: to 
regain a substitute for the prohibited mother (an incestuous relation 
with whom, in some sense, comes to represent, according to Deleuze and 
Guattari, engaging in unregulated desiring production with its immanent
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satisfactions), one must identify with the father and become an active 
agent of the law he represents, or become the object desirable enough 
to obtain passive access to phallic power. This produces a subject whose 
desire is premised upon lack (one desires what one has lost and cannot 
have until one lives up to one’s ego ideal) rather than upon the creation 
of connections with the world that unfold creative capacities in living.
Internalisation of paternal law suppresses pursuit of the mutant 
lines of deterritorialisation that emerge from the swiftly changing 
circumstances induced by the incessant drive for profit, allowing relative 
stability of the oedipal subject (if of a paranoid sort) despite the 
breakdown in traditional codes in living and the habitual patterns of 
life that actualise such codes. Barred from the creative transformation of 
productive connection with the world, the oedipal subject of capitalism 
maintains self-sameness with respect to interchangeable objects of desire 
through repetition of personalised patterns of meaning and behaviour. 
Her desiring production is restricted to fantasising the objects that once 
acquired will give her the satisfaction she seeks. She is thus diverted 
from engaging in the immanently satisfying production of machines that 
would connect her in various ways to the flows around her (machines 
that would extend her capacities and engage her in the kind of on-going 
metamorphosis that makes subjects hard to pin down). The desire to 
connect, make things happen, and extend one’s capacities and powers 
to affect and be affected (the productive desire that constitutes active 
participation in the creative diverging of life) becomes the private desire 
of a personal self to obtain a substitute for an object of desire prohibited 
by paternal law (where the latter is understood as the dominant 
processes regulating social existence in its current configurations).
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari’s characterisation 
of the modern subject de-emphasises the role of the family in the 
production of oedipal subjectivity and elaborates the larger social flows 
that resonate and affirm the constricted desires of a subject premised 
upon lack. From the moment a child is born, she is immersed in 
flows of signification and subjectification, and she enacts, through her 
perceptions, thoughts, actions, and emotions, the habitual patterns 
and orientations of her location on the social field with its particular 
configurations of human and non-human flows. The subject emerges 
from myriad routines and habitual patterns of living in which she 
understands herself and what she says and does through meanings made 
available by the practices engaged in at home, at school, at work, at 
places of worship, at the doctor’s office, at court, and so forth, as well 
as by multiple forms of cultural production ranging from network news
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and printed materials to video games and cinema. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
notion of the faciality machine suggests that the triangulation of identity 
with respect to sexual difference in the family is replicated and affirmed 
with respect to multiple flows of the social field in a way that fixes 
the subject on a ‘white wall’ of signification where she can always be 
categorisable and plunges her into a ‘black hole’ of subjectification where 
her psychic habits of self devolve into sterile patterns. Everyone must 
submit to the dualism machines of subjectification, either identifying 
their subjective experience with one of two opposing categories in a 
series of opposing categories or being subjected to such identification 
by others. A recognisable subject with a specific position vis-a-vis what 
Deleuze and Guattari call the ‘majoritarian subject’ is thereby produced 
‘depending on which faciality trait is retained: male-(female), adult- 
(child), white-(black, yellow, or red); rational-(animal)’ (ATP 292).
The faciality function shows us the form upon which the majoritarian 
subject is based: ‘white, male, adult, “rational,” etc., in short, the 
average European’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 292). Faces are pro­
duced ‘only when the head ceases to be a part of the body, when it ceases 
to be coded by the body, when it ceases to have a multidimensional, 
polyvocal corporeal code’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 170). Mutant 
fluxes and flows of the body, for example, various forms of becoming- 
animal, are no longer elements that are taken up into the socially 
sanctioned organisation of human individuals. ‘Bodies are disciplined, 
corporeality dismantled, becomings-animal hounded out’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 181). The complexity of embodied existence is reduced 
to what can be captured and coded through the faces that are socially 
recognisable (faces that show up on society’s white wall as readable) 
and psychically convincing (faces that can be internalised as one’s 
personal identity). Faces thus entail a reduction of one’s lived experience 
of another human being in all her specificity to the selected perception 
of another in terms of relatively fixed social categories of identity. They 
also entail a personal psychic identity that comes to, in a sense, stand 
in for the unrepresentable subtlety, variation, and ambiguity in the lived 
experience of one’s own corporeality.
Sexed and gendered identities are crucial to the stabilising 
identifications required by the faciality machines; taking up a definitive 
stance with respect to a transcendent representation of desire separated 
from the differentiating flux of life-the phallus as signifier of whatever 
one might desire (with its implications of the passive or active 
relation of the sexed subject vis-a-vis the likelihood of achieving 
satisfaction)-renders the lines of becoming connecting one to the world
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imperceptible and thus totalises a self that can be ranked with respect to 
the majoritarian subject. Forming a central identity as a woman or a man 
with a specific gender identity thus entails a conception of self in relative 
autonomy from the world who takes a passive or active desiring stance 
with respect to that world. This division of humanity into two sexually 
differentiated groups obscures a wide range of social investments of the 
contemporary social field stratified into various configurations of power 
by highlighting sexed identity as key to determining who one is and 
how to live one’s life. A variegated range of differences among human 
subjects is thus reduced in significance when compared to identification 
with one of two categories, woman or man. This binary configuration 
allows resonating patterns of binary identifications that situate subjects 
with respect to the majoritarian subject in ways that clearly delineate 
one’s position according to a relatively static social hierarchy.
At the level of the lived orientation of embodied subjectivity, each 
subject, whether oedipalised or not, lives out her life as a unique 
configuration of the concrete flows of physiological, corporeal, and 
semiotic processes that inform her day-to-day life. How well this 
orientation fits with the categories through which she is designated and 
interpellated by the various practices she engages depends upon her 
specific situation. No subject in contemporary society can escape dealing 
with sex and gender categories in one form or another. Whether one lives 
out these designations and interpellations in comfortable conformity or 
painful dissonance depends upon whether the multiple forces converging 
in the durations one lives resonate with dominant memory (that is, the 
representational memories and history sanctioned by the mainstream) or 
induce varying tendencies toward counter-memories and minoritarian 
resistance. Furthermore, binary sexual difference turns out to entail 
a form of subjectivity structured in terms of bifurcating categories 
that valorise some subjects by marginalising others. Identification with 
one or the other of two sexually differentiated positions (despite the 
molecular connections subverting or complicating that identification) 
is paradigmatic for other selections made from the faces of the 
faciality machines. The active/passive dichotomies of sexual difference 
are replicated in other social binaries with one identification of two 
possibilities being always better or worse (that is, either closer to or 
further from the majoritarian subject).
If a variegated range of social flows (from physiological and cultural 
flows related to one’s able-bodiedness and race to economic and political 
flows related to one’s class and political affiliation) become subsumed 
under one’s sexed and gendered identity with respect to a familial story
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about sexual difference (one is a disabled woman or black woman rather 
than a disabled or black human being; one is disabled or abled, black 
or white, just as one is a woman or a man), then the latter will loom 
large in one’s attempts to live a meaningful life. Troubling the waters 
of binary sexed and gendered identities by revealing the complexities 
subverting them as well as their imbrications with other aspects of 
identity would thus appear to be especially threatening to forms of 
subjectivity organised with respect to the majoritarian subject. If this 
is the case, the feminist imperative to map sex and gender in relation to 
other social designations could be said to be a project of mapping forms 
of subjectivity structured in terms of their divergence from a normative 
subject in order to explore and experiment with the possibilities implicit 
in our present of a subjectivity that could welcome differences without 
ranking them. Mapping subjectivity in terms of sex and gender from 
this perspective respects the importance they play in orienting lived 
experience in its contemporary formations at the same time as it fosters 
lines of flight that could lead to forms of subjectivity that do not require 
marginalising others.
n. Lived Orientations and Feminist Genealogies
Linda Alcoff, in an insightful essay on identity, argues that we need 
to conceive identity as more than a category. Identity entails an 
interpretative horizon that ‘should be understood not simply as a set 
of beliefs but as a complex (meaning internally heterogeneous) set 
of presuppositions and perceptual orientations, some of which are 
manifest as a kind of tacit presence in the body‘ (Alcoff 2006: 113). 
She cites George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work demonstrating that 
the concepts we use in everyday life emerge from ‘largely unconscious 
embodied conceptual systems’ (Alcoff 2006: 113). And she draws from 
the phenomenological descriptions of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone 
de Beauvoir, Sandra Bartky, and Iris Young to indicate how a lived 
orientation of the body in the world constitutes a kind of implicit 
knowledge. On Alcoff’s account, identity is an orientation to the world 
lived in the gestures, movements, and actions of the body at a non- 
conscious level as well as in the presuppositions, assumptions, and beliefs 
of a linguistic orientation. Both together comprise an interpretative 
horizon that grounds a subject in a perspective that is lived as her 
own. Social identity is not simply the categories into which one fits, but 
an interpretative horizon shared with certain others that affects what 
and how one perceives. These identities are experienced in terms of the
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I imbrications of social flows that converge in the various assemblages 
i through which day-to-day life is lived rather than the abstract categories
j of identity to which people are often reduced. Identity is thus not
I necessarily something that is inflicted upon one by others; it is an 
I orientation experienced as one’s own that emerges through participation 
i in collective patterns of corporeal and symbolic activity. This is why 
5 claiming an identity through a rewriting of dominant history can be so 
important. In articulating and asserting such an identity, a perspective 
grounded in patterns of collective living experienced by a minoritarian 
group is brought into conscious awareness and made the basis for an 
alternative epistemological claim to that of the dominant culture about 
the nature of social reality. ‘Real’ identity is thus, according to Alcoff, 
experienced as an orientation grounded in often non-conscious patterns 
of body, mind, and speech so habitual that they can appear (if they 
appear at all) to be inevitable or natural.
What Alcoff calls ‘real’ identity is, from Deleuze and Guattari’s per­
spective, the perceptual, cognitive, affective, and embodied orientations 
of a subject sustained through the habitual patterns of physiological, 
social, and cultural processes that constitute one as an embodied 
human subject. Orientations constituted and sustained through organic 
processes experienced in imbrication with the semiotic and corporeal 
signifying and subjectifying processes of human living inform how one 
experiences the world. If one’s corporeal and/or psychic anomalies are 
such that one cannot take up positions with which one can identify 
without dissonance, then one will experience a sense of discomfort, a 
sense of not being at home in the world.^ This discomfort will deepen 
if dissonance results in derogatory descriptions or exclusion. Subjects 
marked in terms of their divergence from the majoritarian norm are des­
ignated as somehow less entitled to other forms of social power. Unless 
one can find alternatives, practices available to others as an extension of 
their capacities into action in the world (of a more or less powerful sort) 
will block one’s lines of becoming and decrease one’s power. Individual 
and collective orientations suffer damaging marginalisation and uncom­
fortable dissonance when they are subjected to faciality machines in 
ways that mark their divergence from the majoritarian norm and block 
potential capacities for affecting and being affected from unfolding.
When the lived orientations Alcoff describes as ‘real’ identity are 
extended and elaborated in the minoritarian form of, for example, a 
feminist gender identity or an antiracist raced identity, identity becomes 
a form of self-naming that extends some of the lines of flight always 
insisting in any subject in its divergence from the majoritarian subject.
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The faciality machines that designate either/or identity positions through 
prevalent ways of speaking and patterns of activity that resonate with the 
majoritarian subject attempt to cancel out the corporeal and conceptual 
fluxes that would lead human subjects in their becoming to resist 
the dominant patterns of signification and subjectification: you are a 
man or a woman, you are black or white. Resistant identities are 
identities in process-they create new identities rooted in fluxes of living 
that continually vary from the dominant norm, refusing to let those 
variations be assimilated to binary categories or their implicit tendencies 
blocked from unfolding new ways of living.
Subjecting a range of evidence to abstract social categories like race 
and gender tends to obscure the imbrications of social flows as well as 
the ‘intensities’ (implicit tendencies that could unfold in new ways of 
being) insisting in them. Understanding identity categories such as those 
designating one’s gender, race, (dis)ability, or sexuality in terms of the 
concrete situations in which they are used reveals the varying flows 
that converge in the pragmatic contexts in which embodied subjects 
are submitted to and/or identify with specific categories. Mapping these 
flows with respect to one another allows one to see how various 
flows of meaning produce identity categories inflected by the specific 
forms social flows take in a given time and place. For example, Abby 
Wilkerson’s mapping of erotophobia, in an essay using disability and 
queer perspectives to explore continuities in the effect of erotophobia 
on oppressed groups, shows how social flows can be coded in divergent 
and yet mutually reinforcing ways. Wilkerson argues that a paraplegic 
may be coded as asexual, an African American as hypersexual, and a 
lesbian as perverted, but in all cases, the effect is to render the lived 
experience of one’s sexuality less comfortable, thus blocking one’s power 
in the world to a greater or lesser extent. She presents some examples of 
how erotophobic judgements of the sexual behaviours or ‘natures’ of 
members of various groups suggests that
[cjultural erotophobia is not merely a general taboo against open discussions 
of sexuality, and displays of sexual behaviour, but a very effective means of 
creating and maintaining social hierarchies, not only those of sexuality but 
those of gender, race, class, age, and physical and mental ability. (Wilkerson 
2002:41)
Medical literature that presents moralising restrictions on the sexuality 
of the physically or cognitively disabled, hypersexualised images of 
African American and Latino men, legal obstacles to the sexual agency of 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people, the shame and alienation
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connected to the sexuality of heterosexual women that Sandra Bartky 
discusses in her book, Femininity and Domination (Wilkerson 2002; 
42-5): these are some of the effects of social practices that designate 
certain bodies as deviant. From Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective we 
can say that it is through such practices that bodies and their desires 
are delineated in terms of their distance from the majoritarian subject 
acting as an orienting reference point (in more or less overt forms) 
in those practices. Such delineation, through more or less subtle 
approbation (a doctor who refuses to discuss birth control with a 
disabled patient) or outright exclusion (laws against sodomy) renders 
certain lines of becoming uncomfortable, dissonant, or impossible, 
diminishing the power of those groups and their individual members 
to affect and be affected in the process.
Feminists inspired by the Foucauldian notion of genealogy have 
mapped various aspects of the social field to investigate how identity 
designations have evolved over time, leaving legacies in the present 
that might not be immediately obvious. If we look at some feminist 
genealogies of race, for example, we discover not only a telling 
resonance with Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of faciality and the 
majoritarian subject, but how designations of the Eurocentric faciality 
machines are implicated with capitalist and colonialist investments of 
the social field, and how sex and gender designations intertwine with 
race designations according to the configurations of forces of specific 
times and places (see, for example, Lawrence 2003, McWhorter 2004, 
and Warnke 2005). Other feminist genealogies show that sex and 
gender are not only intertwined with race, but with other perhaps 
less obvious (at least if you are closer to the majoritarian norm) 
designations of cognitive and physical ability. For example, Anna 
Stubblefield argues that the concept of feeblemindedness became linked 
with ‘ “off-white” ethnicity, poverty, and gendered conceptions of a lack 
of moral character’ (Stubblefield 2007: 162) in the eugenics movement 
of the first three decades of the twentieth century in the US. The 
eugenics movement was widespread and according to Stubblefield its 
impact still influences scientific research and public policy. In her 
investigation of how, in particular, ‘feeble-minded’ white women became 
subject to coercive sterilisation, Stubblefield examines distinctions white 
elites drew between the white race and other races; (untainted) whites 
(supposedly) have the intellectual capacity to produce ‘civilisation’:
the development of agriculture, science and technology (in forms that
white elites recognize); sophisticated (according to white perception) cultural
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products such as literature, music, and art; and the development of 
complex (according to white perception) societal organization and forms of 
government. (Stubblefield 2007: 169)
Stubblefield cites research by scientists such as Paul Broca, Robert 
Chambers, and J. Langdon Down, in the mid-nineteenth century that 
investigated how to measure intelligence by first assuming that white 
people were more intelligent than black people, and then, on the basis of 
that assumption, construing differences between white and black people 
as reasons for why white people were further along an evolutionary 
path of ethnic types than black people. When Henry Hubert Goddard, 
writing in the early twentieth century, described intelligence (understood 
in terms of this model of ethnic evolution) as hereditary and impervious 
to environmental influence, the stage was set for designating ‘heritable’ 
forms of white impurity (Stubblefield 2007: 172).
In 1908, Goddard adapted Alfred Binet’s intelligence test for use 
in the United States by adding the category of ‘moron’ (designating 
people with a mental age of eight to twelve) to the original scale that 
included the ‘idiot’ (designating people with a mental age of two or 
younger) and ‘imbecile’ (designating people with a mental age of three 
to seven years). The notion that extreme poverty was hereditary and 
linked to the moral defect ‘of a supposedly shameless willingness to 
live on public charity’ (Stubblefield 2007: 173) was a widespread belief 
that became increasingly linked to the concept of the moron in family 
studies done in the early twentieth century. Feeblemindedness became 
linked with ‘white poverty, off-whiteness, and lack of civilization­
building skills’ and the ‘category of the moron - the feebleminded person 
who appears normal but who is prone to immorality, incapable of 
being a contributing citizen in a democratic society, and who will 
pass feeblemindedness on to his or her offspring’ became ‘a powerful 
device for drawing a distinction between tainted and pure white people’ 
(Stubblefield 2007: 176). In addition, white women who demonstrated 
their failure to understand their role in the advancement of civilisation 
by engaging in unchaste behaviour manifested, like impoverished white 
women and off-white women, a ‘lack’ of intellect that tainted their 
whiteness. Thus, intertwined constructions of race, class, gender, and 
cognitive dis/ability came together in a conception of feeblemindedness 
that ‘became gendered in a way that led to women bearing the brunt of 
eugenic sterilization’ (Stubblefield 2007: 178-9).
‘Disabled’ subjects may be divergent enough from the majoritarian 
norm that their disability becomes a salient feature of their designated
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identity. Even in such cases, however, their sexed and gendered identity 
will be central to how that identity is interpreted and lived. Stubblefield’s 
mapping reveals specific physiological, economic, colonising, and 
cultural flows in the use of the term ‘feeble-minded’ that manifest 
the imbrications of gender, race, cognitive (dis)ability, and economic 
status in that designation in a way that belies the primacy given to sex 
and gender in organising and understanding the converging flows of 
concrete individuals. A wide range of practices resonate with familial 
positioning in order to reinforce and naturalise distance from the 
majoritarian subject. Maps like Wilkerson’s reveal the social investments 
and configurations of power that such positioning conceals.
In addition to revealing the multiple forces that come together in one 
designation of social identity, feminist maps reveal critical points in the 
present where intensification of various sorts could result in significant 
change. Thus, Wilkerson and Stubblefield’s genealogies reveal relations 
of flows of which we may not have been aware that condition our 
understanding of disability. Intensifying these connections in new ways 
of understanding designations of disability and racial designations, as 
well as the social practices related to them, could in turn lead to action 
from within the relevant practices that shift them (to a larger or lesser 
extent) into divergent forms of those practices or directly challenge 
them (through discursive critique or some other form of resistance). 
These genealogies, incomplete as they are, show how important it is 
to understand how identity designations - be they those of sex, gender, 
sexuality, race or otherwise - emerge and are interpreted in keeping with 
specific investments of the social field best understood in terms of the 
confluence of multiple forces of particular durations. The bifurcating 
sorting of personal identity into yes/no categories obscures the shifting 
vagaries of their evolution as they are put into effect in a multitude of 
day-to-day situations. Although an emphasis on the personal identity 
of an autonomous subject and the demand for clearly defined identity 
designations tend to suggest that a given identity is a property of persons, 
on Deleuze and Guattari’s view, identity is produced, reproduced, 
sustained, and transformed through the unfolding of social life over 
specific periods of time in particular places.
A designation of gender, race, or disability can never, from Deleuze 
and Guattari’s perspective, be a static category. Its meanings inevitably 
shift along with the faciality machines (as they are actualised in specific 
patterns of meaning and activity) that enact it as well as the molecular 
flows of lived orientations and identifications that resist those machines. 
Such shifts are in response to the convergent forces affecting the
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relevant assemblages and will resonate with patterns organised around 
the majoritarian subject or proliferate lines of flight. Words such as 
‘disabled’ or ‘feeble-minded’ and the racial, gendered, and economic 
connotations associated with them, leave traces in the present of which 
we may be unaware, even if those specific words are no longer used. 
Ways of speaking and doing become habitual patterns that self-replicate 
even if in doing so they continually diverge from past repetitions. 
Mapping an association among variations in cognitive style, skin colour, 
financial income, and cultural practices of the duration connecting us to 
an earlier time renders some of the relations now only implicit explicit, 
making us more aware of the habitual patterns informing our naturalised 
reality, and thus provide insight into how to shift those patterns in ways 
we can support.
These genealogies track social practices that constitute subject 
positions informing the categories through which people are designated 
as well as identify themselves. These practices, from Deleuze and 
Guattari’s perspective, are corporeal and semiotic assemblages that 
tend to replicate and extend themselves, thus settling into stratified 
configurations of power. Individual human beings with their personal 
identities and desires emerge as individual solutions to the problem 
of subjectivity from processes they collectively share in various ways 
with others. Although sexed and gendered identity is a crucial feature 
of dominant forms of subjectivity, these genealogies show how other 
investments of the social field are equally, if not more, crucial. Even 
when one’s personal identity is still experienced in terms of one’s sex, 
gender, and sexuality (for example, one’s primary identification is as 
a woman), these genealogies show the myriad social investments that 
coalesce around that identity (it turns out a woman who primarily 
identifies as a woman may be more likely to be relatively closer to the 
majoritarian norm and so has not been confronted with other ways that 
she differs from that norm-that is, she is a physically and cognitively 
‘normal,’ white, heterosexual, middle-class woman).
From Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective, modern subjectivity, insofar 
as it is oriented with respect to the majoritarian subject, thus entails 
organising multiple flows and investments of the social field in terms of 
sexual difference. This structuring plays out through the oedipalising 
function of the family and the faciality machines that confirm and 
elaborate the binary structure of oedipalisation. Oedipalisation and 
the faciality machines that produce the personal identity of modern 
subjectivity thus operate not only to render the continuous variation 
in human becoming that might extend into new forms of subjectivity
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non-productive, but also to turn collective stories about power 
investments into personal stories about achieving meaningful lives. 
Although Deleuze and Guattari do not themselves pursue this point, this 
makes feminism an intervention that targets sex, gender, and sexuality as 
a crucial fault line in modern forms of subjectivity that is just the starting 
point for unravelling multiple configurations of power detrimental to our 
collective unfolding.
in. Nomadic Subjectivity and Feminist Change
The deterritorialising of cultural codes precipitated by capitalism opens 
human existence to an unprecedented amount of creative evolution by 
releasing old constraints upon proliferating change. Thus, capitalism 
actually enacts more of the differing and diverging becoming of life 
and so, according to Deleuze and Guattari, on the one hand, puts 
us in a better situation to become more aware of life as process, but 
on the other hand, has produced a reterritorialisation onto oedipal or 
majoritarian subjectivity, the reduction of productive desire to desire 
premised on lack, and the incessant pressure to produce and consume. 
The former tendency they align with their notion of schizophrenia and 
a nomadic subject able to creatively evolve and the latter tendencies 
they associate with paranoia and absolute systems of belief where all 
meaning is, as Eugene Holland helpfully puts it, ‘permanently fixed 
and exhaustively defined by a supreme authority, figure-head, or god’ 
(Holland 1999: 3). Thus, along with the high speeds of contemporary 
life with its frantic pace of technological change and globalisation goes 
paranoid reterritorialisation onto consumerism as well as fundamentalist 
religion and fascist politics. Faciality machines are not universal to 
human life; subjectivity in modern capitalism requires excluding more of 
the corporeal fluxes running through any line of human becoming than 
the other two social formations Deleuze and Guattari describe (although 
this, in itself, does not guarantee the kind of desiring production 
Deleuze and Guattari would like to promote). Rather than explore 
possible connections among micropercepts and affects that could lead 
to aggregates of perception and feeling that violate current opinion 
and consensus representations of reality, faciality machines interpret 
sensation as the meaningful experience of a recognisable subject. Rather 
than pursue the physiological, social, and cultural permutations that 
inevitably result from hybrid forces converging in particular locations, 
faciality machines interpret anomalies as exceptions that do not affect 
the norm or as exceptions that require new categories that resonate 
with the system as a whole. This entails cancelling out subtleties
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in individual and collective experience and blocking exploration of 
alternative connections.
Facialisation entails an embodied orientation organised in terms of a 
personal identity. That is, all desires of the body are of one body with a 
psychic self that is (more or less) unified with a coherent history that can 
be represented and collated with the narratives of other members of the 
community. Sexed and gendered identity forms an important fault line 
of this self since it is through familial positioning with respect to sexual 
difference that the multiplicity of social flows affecting subjectivity 
are totalised in a self that is assimilable to the faciality machines of 
capitalism. Personal identity, especially as it is regulated by the faciality 
machines that percolate throughout the semiotic and corporeal practices 
that insist on clearly delineated subjects with identities that fit into 
already laid out parameters (to register for public school, I need to 
designate age, sex, and residence; to walk into a restroom I need to know 
to which sex my body conforms), becomes the organising reference point 
for lived experience. If a lived experience cannot be referred to such 
reference points, it may be unrepresentable and excluded from having 
an impact (the knowledge I gain independently of a recognised school 
may not gain me entry to the conference I want to attend), or it can 
render lived experience either dissonant or unlivable (ambiguous sexed 
or gendered identity can make life painfully confusing). But on Deleuze 
and Guattari’s view, personal identity is not necessary for non-psychotic 
subjectivity. Habitual refrains and some sort of constriction on desiring 
production are necessary for relatively stable forms of human subjects to 
be sustainable. But subjectivity is a self-organising system of becoming 
with relative autonomy from surrounding flows grounded in a wide 
range of territorialised processes that allow emotions, perceptions, and 
day-to-day life to stabilise into habitual patterns. In a social formation 
premised upon a lacking subject threatened with a loss of humanity 
insofar as she or he breaks the rules (where the majoritarian subject 
is the norm for what it is to be human and any deviation from that 
norm is carefully observed and marked), unregulated refrains in living 
are not allowed extension into new patterns. Productive desire must 
be reduced to the lacking desire of a self still waiting to be completed (the 
child’s desire to swirl water into dirt to make mud must give way to the 
desire to be a chef or a scientist rather than simply to make connections), 
and identity must be computed from the bifurcating patterns of social 
recognition that select constants from a wide range of continuous 
variation in order to plug those constants into already delineated rules of 
living (a woman who is disabled must no longer be interested in sex since 
she no longer fits the subject positions designated in countless narratives
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and scenarios emerging in multiple social practices about ‘what happens 
when one is sexual,’ a mother who does not feel the kind of ‘maternal’ 
love for all her children depicted in various forms of cultural production 
as well as assumed in social practices connected to childcare, pedagogy, 
and citizenship must be an inhuman monster).
From a psychoanalytic perspective, immersion in a world of partial 
objects where corporeal fluxes connect (or do not connect) in 
immanently unfolding flows with surrounding flows where neither self or 
other, subject or object, are points of reference is a psychotic nightmare. 
Deleuze and Guattari present us with the provocative possibility that 
desire does not have to be about what a personal self wants, but 
could be about connecting with the world, making things happen, 
and experiencing what happens in ways that defy subject/object and 
self/other dichotomies. Self/other dichotomies obscure the physiological, 
social, and cultural flows I share with others; I live at the same speed as 
other organisms with similar configurations of processes (as I discover 
in the assemblages I make with others) and the semiotic and material 
assemblages that condition my individual speech and actions are often 
the same. On Deleuze and Guattari’s view, a personal self or identity 
as a totalised point of origin to which to refer all desire operates as a 
kind of stranglehold on the individual and the capacities it could unfold 
as well as the assemblages into which it could enter. By referring my 
desires to a sexed self with a gender and a sexuality computed according 
to the faciality machines, I block off intensification of other tendencies 
insisting in me-tendencies concerning sense experience and perception 
as well as emotions and beliefs - that could be extended into new ways 
of living my subjectivity and new ways of connecting with my world 
including the other subjects within it.
The famous case of John/Joan (who I will henceforth call by his 
real name when living as the sex he ultimately chose, David) is a 
sad example of how difficult it can be to live one’s humanity in a 
social formation that demands a recognisable identity sorted through 
the faciality machines.^ When a botched circumcision led to an anomaly 
in organic sex (David’s penis was damaged beyond repair), a choice was 
made to try and repress the anomalous range of continuous variation in 
human organisms he manifested by surgically altering bim, designating 
him as female, and concealing from him his initial status as male. Judith 
Butler’s rendition of his story brings out the violence to which the people 
trying to deal with his situation subjected bim. Although as he grew 
older he refused to comply, he was submitted to practices designed 
to remake him organically so that he would fit certain categories 
(surgery and hormone therapy), as well as subjectively so that he would
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identify in particular ways (socialisation that encouraged him to engage 
in ‘feminine’ behaviour such as cooking and playing with dolls and 
interviews that encouraged him to have ‘feminine’ desires).'*
From Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective, there was no true self 
attached to either David’s ‘real’ sex (his clearly male body as it existed 
before the accident) or his gender identity as it had been promoted 
through subjectification procedures designed to create a female gender 
identity (being identified and treated as a girl, being subjected to 
interviews designed to elicit ‘female’ desires and so forth). David’s 
flow of individuation involved a convergence of physiological, semiotic, 
and subjectifying forces to which he-as a self-organising process of 
subjectivity needing to navigate the practices of his social location - had 
to respond in order to solve the problem of living a life. Although David 
did achieve his desire to marry and have a family, his life was, by all 
accounts, difficult, and he committed suicide at the age of 38. It is 
impossible to know why he made the choice to end his life, but one 
can imagine how painful dissonance between one’s lived experience in 
all the molecular complexity of one’s lived orientation and the molar 
subject positions designating one’s identity in a way that demands the 
erasure of such complexity can become. His situation was anomalous in 
a way that could not be easily cancelled out; he simply was neither male 
nor female in the same way as his peers, given physiological anomalies 
as well as anomalies in his socialisation.
Susan Stryker, a male-to-female transsexual who refuses assimilating 
explanations of her actions (such as the explanation that she was ‘really’ 
a woman who simply needed to change her body to fit her true identity), 
is a happier example of how anomalous gender identity can play out 
in that she is able to intensify and extend her capacities to affect and 
be affected by the world in ways that challenge the binaries of the 
faciality machines. She speaks out publicly about her situation and she is 
a respected member of a transgender community that challenges binary 
designations of sexed and gendered identity. She thus defies erasure of 
the range of continuous variation manifest in her particular actualisation 
of humanity despite her deviance from the norm. She gives a provocative 
challenge to those who would denounce her and her choices (in a 
performance piece presented in, as she puts it, ‘genderfuck drag’ at an 
interdisciplinary, academic conference)^:
I find no shame... in acknowledging my egalitarian relationship with 
non-human material Being; everything emerges from the same matrix of 
possibilities.... [T]he Nature you bedevil me with is a lie. Do not trust 
it to protect you from what I represent, for it is a fabrication that cloaks
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the groundlessness of the privilege you seek to maintain for yourself at my 
expense. You are as constructed as me; the same anarchic Womb has birthed 
us both. (Stryker 1999)
David and Stryker both, in different ways, resist the faciality machines 
that would recuperate their inassimilable differences to binary categories 
of designation and interpellation. If David had difficulties in identifying 
with the categories assigned him (when he was forced to identify as 
a girl despite his lived dissonance with that designation) as well as 
the categories he finally chose (by choosing to identify as male upon 
discovering some of what had been hidden from him about the story 
of his life), it was not because he wanted to challenge traditional 
notions of sex and gender. What he wanted was to live a meaningful 
life. What his story shows, perhaps, is how important a sense of 
self that coheres with one’s lived orientations is to making one’s life 
meaningful and therefore livable. We want to connect with the world, 
affect and be affected, in ways that resonate with a self-understanding 
and life narrative that makes sense to us, whether or not that sense 
of self is conventional or dissonant. In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, 
we might say that subjects need to extend not only their embodied 
capacities to make things happen, but also their psychic, cognitive, and 
emotional capacities to make sense of how they fit into larger wholes. 
David’s lived experience was too dissonant for a number of reasons 
(anatomical, hormonal, cultural, familial) to easily fit into social patterns 
of making sense-ways of speaking, interpreting, and behaving available 
to him through collective practices of the social field dictating intelligible 
behaviour and interpretations - making it difficult for him to feel worthy 
as a human being.
Deleuze and Guattari’s characterisation of subjectivity posits a subject 
who emerges from collective physiological and social processes as an 
individual process in its own right by sustaining habitual patterns 
distinguishing it as an individual from other processes around it. 
As a specific formation of physiological, social, and linguistic matter 
with actualised capacities - replete with hidden potential and tendencies 
structured by virtualities that are part of the wider non-human as 
well as human field conditioning its becoming-the subject is able to 
affect as well as be affected by what is around it. But its separation is 
always provisional, its form always on the verge of differentiating into 
something else, and the actualisation of its capacities always dependent 
upon the actualities and intensities that it is and with which it comes into 
contact.
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Nomadic subjects emerge from collective patterns of living with the 
configuration of social and non-human forces unique to the becoming of 
specific processes of individuation. The individuation of such subjects 
cannot be represented. It emerges as a lived orientation constituting 
one’s perceptions, thoughts, emotions, and perspectives through the 
territorialisations of unique individuations and communities grounded 
in the material reality of shared patterns of living. Some orientation 
with respect to the identity designations of mainstream social practices 
is necessary for subjectivity. One’s ‘personal’ identity can be thought in 
terms of the ‘molar’ designations of the faciality machines that enable 
negotiation of dominant social systems of meaning or in terms of 
lived orientations too subtle to be captured through such designations, 
but which one could choose to assert by naming them. Heightened 
awareness of converging flows and the habitual patterns that orient 
one along with a sense of one’s own location and places to intervene 
in order to affect individual and collective forms of self-production 
could allow resolution of the dissonance often arising between the two 
forms of identity as well as enable collective compositions that enhance 
mutually joyful becoming. Nomadic subjectivity as an alternative to 
oedipal subjectivity invites us to engage in a dynamic process of 
self-naming rather than reduce ourselves to static self-representations. 
Identity designations are representations that do not capture the nuances 
of lived orientations and can block lines of flight by putting people 
in opposition with one another despite the orientations they share. 
Drifting from the identity designations of faciality machines in order 
to experiment with joyful connections entails relinquishing some of the 
control derived through representational intelligence with its penchant 
for categorisation in order to trust the affective guidance of intuitive 
insight into processes of becoming. Becoming more aware of how 
one’s subjectivity is produced allows one to participate more actively 
in one’s self-production, develop skilful ways to synchronise becoming 
with others, and deterritorialise from identity designations in order to 
unfold new solutions to the problems life poses. Flexible living entails 
individual deterritorialisation from personal identity as well as collective 
deterritorialisations from majoritarian subjectivity. A politics influenced 
by Deleuze and Guattari would investigate different durations, the 
mutually reinforcing reference points of the faciality machines among 
those durations, and the places where intensification of virtual tendencies 
might unfold new answers to how to live together.
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of human subjectivity emphasises 
its continuity with the inhuman force of creative life. This emphasis
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fosters working with rather than against the differentiating forces of life 
of which we are a part. This ontology conceives individual human beings 
as singular individuals who more or less diverge from the flows of life 
currently sustaining themselves in the recognisably human forms with 
which we are familiar. The question of one’s humanity thus shifts from 
that of measuring up to an essential form of humanity (with respect 
to which many are found wanting) to the question of what diverging 
flows of humanity we want to foster in the inevitably diverging and 
differentiating flux of human life. Shifting the question in this way 
has practical impact on identity questions key to feminist thought. 
Women, as well as others who are ‘other’ to the paradigmatic subject 
of contemporary culture, have been denigrated for somehow failing to 
measure up to an ideal norm of what it means to be human. But such a 
norm assumes an ontology where the form one’s humanity takes may 
well count as a deviation. One strategy of feminism, understandably 
enough, has been to contest what that essence is in order to make room 
for women. Shifting to an ontology of becoming suggests a different kind 
of strategy. If what it means to be human is not fixed, if human becoming 
entails creative evolution - if what it means to be human consists in the 
specific forms humanity actually takes and could unfold rather than a 
human essence that is then instantiated more or less well-then what 
feminists need to do is map where we are in order to find the best 
places to intervene and foster the human forms we would most like to 
support. The question then becomes not who we have always been and 
always will be, but how to make the mechanisms that create subjects 
and identities better function in keeping with our own becomings.
Feminism could be seen as an untimely schizo practice designed 
to intervene with contemporary configurations of modern subjectivity 
that involve suppression and oppression of subjects that deviate from 
a majoritarian norm with the fault lines of sexed, gendered, and 
sexual identity as its starting point. Deleuze and Guattari provide a 
narrative about the formation and production of those subjects that 
suggest critical points of intervention that could move us beyond binary 
categorisation of sex and gender and the oppression it entails. By 
distinguishing subjectivity as patterns of lived activity from faciality 
machines that designate identity they give us a way of understanding 
how we could be subjects without the binary designations that we 
currently think of as crucial to being any kind of subject at all. But 
they do not think we can simply choose to leave those binary machines 
behind. Rather, they recommend carefully mapping where we are in 
order to find vitalising paths that extend the tendencies resisting binary
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designations. And they suggest that rather than be paranoid about the 
anarchic chaos we imagine moving beyond such binaries could cause, 
that we consider the capacities we could unfold if we could open up 
to the impersonal and inhuman flows around us. They present us with 
alternative conceptions of subjectivity as relatively stabilised patterns of 
physiological, corporeal, and semiotic activity that mutate over time in 
keeping with the flows that constitute them and the flows with which 
they come into contact, but which, as self-organising systems, and, in 
particular, human self-organising systems with the capacity to intuit the 
durational whole, can consciously participate in their creative evolution. 
And while such participation does not entail the masterful control of 
the autonomous subject as conceived by traditional modernity, it does 
entail ways of being more skilful than others in coming into joyful 
synchrony with the flows around it. Feminism, as a theoretical and 
pragmatic process, can intuit ways of living our sex and gender that 
are more affirming of the continuous range of variation in being sexed 
and gendered becoming-human entails. By mapping where we are and 
finding lines of flight from majoritarian subjectivity that can extend our 
capacities in ways that synchronise with others, feminists, along with 
other forms of minoritarian and schizo becoming, can promote a joyfully 
collective and open-ended process of becoming-human.
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Notes
1. Deleuze and Guattari’s account is compatible with Foucault’s reading of sexed 
identity as taking on new importance in the circulation of biopower and the 
management of large groups of people emerging in the eighteenth century. 
Whereas one’s sex in premodern times had significance in the role one would 
play and the patterns of social living in which one participated, it was not key 
to personal identity, on both these accounts, until the emergence of a modern 
subject with its increasingly interiorised psychic structure (see Foucault 1978). 
See Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals for an account of the interiorisation of 
subjectivity in the context of Christianity that influences Deleuze and Guattari’s 
account (Nietzsche 1989).
2. Sara Ahmed presents an example of an evocative phenomenological account of 
how a queer orientation can precipitate such dissonance (Ahmed 2006).
3. ‘John/Joan’ was actually David Reimer. For more information on this case from 
various perspectives, see Colapinto 1997, 2000, and 2004, Diamond 1997, 
Diamond and Sigmundsen 1997, and Money 1997. I am particularly indebted 
to Judith Butler’s provocative rendition of this case that brings out the problem 
David posed to the people who responded to him by attempting to render him 
intelligible from competing perspectives as a problem of a humanity that exceeds 
intelligibility. On Butler’s view: ‘it is precisely the ways in which he is not fully 
recognizable, fully disposable, fully categorizable, that his humanness emerges’ 
(Butler 2004: 73).
4. David’s situation was particularly contentious since there were at least two views 
of who he ‘really’ was that were being promoted and contested. To oversimplify 
what were more complicated and evolving positions over the course of a long
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debate, John Money, a medical psychologist and founder of the Gender Identity 
Institute at Johns Hopkins University, thought gender identity was malleable and 
hoped David’s case would prove him right (it helped that David had an identical 
twin-the perfect complement to an experiment in manipulating gender identity 
through socialisation) and Milton Diamond, a sex researcher involved in a long­
standing battle with Money, believed gender identity had a hormonal basis. See 
Diamond 1997, Diamond and Sigmundsen 1997, and Money 1997.
5. Stryker describes her outfit as ‘combat boots, threadbare Levi 501s over a black 
lace body suit, a shredded Transgender Nation T-shirt with the neck and sleeves 
cut out, a pink triangle, quartz crystal pendant, grunge metal jewellery, and 
a six-inch long marlin hook dangling around my neck on a length of heavy 
stainless steel chain’ (Stryker 1999: 2). There are, of course, social flows involved 
in transgender identity that are the subject of heated discussion in feminist and 
transgender debates that I do not here address.
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